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Abstract Security Assurance Cases (SAC) are a form
of structured argumentation used to reason about the
security properties of a system. After the successful
adoption of assurance cases for safety, SAC are getting
significant traction in recent years, especially in safety-
critical industries (e.g., automotive), where there is an
increasing pressure to be compliant with several secu-
rity standards and regulations. Accordingly, research in
the field of SAC has flourished in the past decade, with
different approaches being investigated. In an effort to
systematize this active field of research, we conducted a
systematic literature review (SLR) of the existing aca-
demic studies on SAC. Our review resulted in the in-
depth analysis and comparison of 51 papers. Our re-
sults indicate that, while there are numerous papers
discussing the importance of security assurance cases
and their usage scenarios, the literature is still imma-
ture with respect to concrete support for practition-
ers on how to build and maintain a SAC. More impor-
tantly, even though some methodologies are available,
their validation and tool support is still lacking.
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1 Introduction
A security assurance case (a.k.a. security case, or SAC)
is a structured set of arguments that are supported by
material evidence and can be used to reason about the
the security posture of a software system. Security as-
surance cases represent an emerging trend in the secure
development of critical systems, especially in domains
like automotive and healthcare. The adoption of secu-
rity cases in these industries is compelled by the recent
introduction of standards and legislation. For instance,
the upcoming standard ISO/SAE 21434 on Road Vehi-
cles Cybersecurity Engineering includes the explicit re-
quirement to create ‘cybersecurity cases’ to show that
a vehicle’s computing infrastructure is secure.
The creation of a security case, however, is far from
trivial, especially for large organizations with complex
product development structures. For instance, some tech-
nical choices about the security case might require a
change of the development process. For example, the
security case shown in Figure 1 (and discussed in Sec-
tion 2) requires that a thorough threat analysis is con-
ducted throughout the product structure and at differ-
ent stages of the development. If this is not the case, a
thorough re-organization of the way of working is neces-
sary, or maybe the security case should have been struc-
tured in a different shape. Also, the construction of a
security case often requires the collaboration of several
stakeholders in the organization, e.g., to ensure that all
the necessary evidence is collected from the software
and process artifacts.
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To summarize, companies are facing the conundrum
of making both urgent and challenging decisions con-
cerning the adoption of security cases. Naturally, they
could refer to academic research, which has published
a relatively large number of papers on the topic in re-
cent years. In order to facilitate such endeavor, this pa-
per presents a systematic literature review (SLR) of
research papers on security cases. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study of this kind in this
field. This SLR collects most relevant resources (51 pa-
pers) and presents their analysis according to a rich set
of attributes like, the types of augmentation structures
that are proposed in the literature (threat identifica-
tion –used in Figure 1– being one option), the maturity
of the existing approaches, the ease of adoption, the
availability of tool support, and so on. Ultimately, this
paper presents a complete guideline to adoption geared
towards practitioners. To this aim, we have created a
workflow describing the suggested activities that are in-
volved in the adoption process for security cases. Each
stage of the workflow is annotated with a suggested
reading list, which refers to the papers included in this
SLR. We remark that the SLR also represents a useful
tool for academics in order identify research gaps and
opportunities, which are discussed in this paper as well.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we provide some background on assurance
cases and discuss the related work. In Section 3 we de-
scribe the research questions and the methodology of
this study. In Section 4 we list the papers included in
this study and present the results of the analysis. In
Section 5 we further discuss the results and present the
workflow for security cases adoption. Finally, Section 7
presents the concluding remarks.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Assurance cases
Assurance cases are defined by the GSN standard [32]
as “A reasoned and compelling argument, supported by
a body of evidence, that a system, service or organisa-
tion will operate as intended for a defined application in
a defined environment.”. Assurance cases can be doc-
umented in either textual or graphical forms. Figure 1
depicts a very simple example of an assurance case and
its two main parts, i.e., the argument and the evidence.
The case in the figure follows the GSN notation [67],
and consists of the following nodes: claim (also called
goal), context, strategy, assumption (also called justifi-
cation), and evidence (also called solution). At the top
of the case, there is usually a high level claim, which is
broken down to sub-claims based on certain strategies.
Fig. 1 An example of an assurance case
The claims specifies the goals we want to assure in the
case, e.g., that a certain system is secure. An example
of a strategy is to break down a claim based on differ-
ent security attributes. The breaking down of claims is
repeatedly done until we reach a point where evidence
can be assigned to justify the claims/sub-claims. Exam-
ples of evidence are test results, monitoring reports, and
code review reports. The assumptions made while ap-
plying the strategies, e.g., that all relevant threats have
been identified, are made explicit using the assumption
nodes. The context of the claims is also explicitly set
in the context nodes. An example of a context is the
definition of an acceptably secure system.
Assurance cases have been widely used for safety
critical systems in multiple domains [10]. An example
is the automotive industry, where safety cases have been
used for demonstrating compliance with the functional
safety standard ISO 26262 [52,9,36]. However, there is
an increasing interest in using these cases for security as
well. For instance, the upcoming automotive standard
ISO 23434 [37] explicitly requires the creation of cyber-
security arguments. Security assurance cases are special
types of assurance cases where the claims are about
the security of the system in question, and the body of
evidence justifies the security claims.
2.2 Related work
To the best of our knowledge this study is the first
systematic literature review on security assurance cases.
However, there have been studies covering the literature
on safety assurance cases.
Nair et al. [48] conducted a systematic literature
review to classify artefacts which can be considered as
safety evidence. The researchers contributed with a tax-
onomy of the evidence, and listed the most frequent
evidence types referred to in literature. The results of
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Table 1 Assessment criteria for RQ1 (rationale).
RQ1 criteria Values
Motivation E.g., compliance to stan-
dards
. . .
Usage scenario E.g., support for court case
. . .
the study show that the structure of safety evidence is
mostly induced by the argumentation and that the as-
sessment of the evidence is done in a qualitative manner
in the majority of cases in contrast to quantitative as-
sessment. Finally, the researchers list eight challenges
related to safety evidence, and the creation of safety
cases was the second most mentioned one in literature
according to the study.
Maksimov et al. [43] contributed with a system-
atic literature review of assurance case tools. The re-
searchers list 37 tools that have been developed in the
past two decades, and an analysis of their function-
alities. The study also includes an evaluation of the
reported tools on multiple aspects, such as creation
support, maintenance, assessment, and reporting. In
our study, we also review supporting tools for assur-
ance cases’ creation, but we focus on the reported tools
specifically for SAC.
Gade et al. [25] conducted a literature review of
assurance-driven software design. The researchers pro-
vide a review of 15 research papers with an explana-
tion of the techniques and methodologies each of these
papers provide with regards to assurance-driven soft-
ware design. This work intersects with our work in that
assurance-driven software design can be used as a method-
ology or approach for creating assurance cases. How-
ever, unlike Gade et al. [25] our study focuses on SAC,
and is done in a systematic way.
3 Research Method
We conducted a systematic literature review following
the guidelines introduced by Kitchenham et al. [40].
3.1 Research questions and assessment criteria
This study aims at answering the following research
questions.
[RQ1]RATIONALE— In the literature, what
rationale is provided to support the adoption of
SAC? In particular, we are interested in whether there
are statements that go beyond the intuitive rationale
of using SAC “for security assurance”. For instance, our
Table 2 Assessment criteria for RQ2 (construction)
RQ2 criteria Values
Approach provided Yes / No
Coverage Argumentation
Evidence
Generic (i.e., both)
Argumentation E.g., based on threat avoid-
ance
(if covered) . . .
Evidence E.g., collect test results
(if covered) . . .
initial research [46] indicated that compliance with se-
curity standards and regulations is also an important
driver. As shown in Table 1, to answer this research
question we analyze the surveyed papers and extract
two characteristics:
(i) Motivation, i.e., the reason for using SAC as stated
by the researchers. We used two criteria for deter-
mining whether a certain study provides a motiva-
tion for using SAC. That is, the wording has to
be explicit (i.e., there must be a reference to us-
age or advantage) and specific (i.e., providing some
details).
(ii) Usage scenario, i.e., scenarios in which SAC could
be used to achieve additional goals, next to to secu-
rity assurance. We used the same criteria (explicit
and specific mention) used for the motivation.
[RQ2]CONSTRUCTION— In the literature,
which approaches are reported for the construc-
tion of security assurance cases, and which as-
pects do the approaches cover? This question aims
at inventorying the existing approaches for creating SAC,
which is a challenging task for adopters. As shown in
Table 2, we also assess the coverage of the approach,
i.e., whether it can be used for creating the argumen-
tation, for collecting the evidence, or both. Finally, for
each covered part of the SAC, we identify the gist of
the approach with respect to the suggested argumenta-
tion strategy and the types of evidence to be used in
creating SACs.
[RQ3] SUPPORT — In the literature, what
practical support is offered to facilitate the adop-
tion of SAC? The purpose of this question is to un-
derstand the practicalities of creating and working with
SAC. With reference to Table 3, first we study the ap-
proaches and identify the conditions (i.e., prerequisites)
that have to be met in order for the outcome of the pa-
per to be applicable. These prerequisites Second, we
check whether the papers propose libraries of patterns
or templeteized SAC, as these are extremely usefult for
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Table 3 Assessment criteria for RQ3 (support)
RQ3 criteria Values
Prerequisites E.g., threat
modeling is
performed
. . .
Patterns E.g., a catalog
or argumentation
patterns is pro-
vided
. . .
Tool support Tool mentioned Yes / No
Type of tool Created / Used
Notation Graphical (GSN)
Graphical (CAE)
Textual
. . .
Table 4 Assessment criteria for RQ4 (validation).
RQ4 criteria Values
Type Illustration
Case study
Experiment
Other
Domain Medical
Automotive
Software engineer-
ing
. . .
Data source Research project
Commercial product
. . .
SAC created Yes / No
Creators Academic authors
Industrial authors
3rd party experts
Validators Academic authors
Industrial authors
3rd party experts
non-expert adopters. Third, we analyze the tool sup-
port. We check whether the paper suggests the usage of
a tool for any of the activities related to SAC. In case
it does, we extract the description of that tool, and
whether it was created by the researchers or if it is a
third party tool used in the paper. The last characteris-
tic in this research question is the notation used to rep-
resent the SAC. The most common ones are GSN [67],
and CAE [1], but there are other notations such as plain
text.
[RQ4]VALIDATION— In the literature, what
evidence is provided concerning the validity of
the reported approaches? Our interest is to under-
stand how the approaches and usage scenarios of SAC
are validated (or supported by any evidence). We aim
at identifying:
i The type of the validation conducted in the study,
e.g., case study, or experiment. Note that ‘case study’
is a widely used term to refer to worked examples
[19,58]. In this work, we consider a validation con-
ducted in an industrial context to be a case study
[81], and those done within a research context to
be illustrations. Experiments are studies in which
independent variables are manipulated to test their
effect on dependent variables [19].
ii The domain (i.e., application area) in which the val-
idation is conducted.
iii The source of the data used for the validation, e.g.,
a research project or a commercial product.
iv Whether or not a SAC is created as part of the val-
idation process.
v In case a SAC is created, we look for its creators.
This characteristic has three levels, which are aca-
demic authors, authors with industrial background,
or expert group.
vi The validators, i.e., the parties that conducted the
validation (similar to the creators).
3.2 Performing the systematic review
We performed a search for papers related to SAC by
means of 3 scientific search engines: IEEE Xplore, ACM
Digital Library, and Elsevier Scopus. We did not use
Google Scholar as, in our own prior experience, the re-
sults from this search engine overlap with the results of
the engines we we mentioned above.
3.2.1 Constructing the search string
To maximize the chance of obtaining all the relevant pa-
pers in the field, the search string used in the search en-
gines must contain keywords that are commonly used in
said papers. Therefore, prior to constructing the search
string, we familiarized ourselves with the specific ter-
minology used by researchers in the field of security as-
surance cases. To do so, we conducted a manual search
for papers related to SAC that were published in the
past five years in the following venues: SAFECOMP,
CCS, SecDev, ESSOS, ISSRE, ARES, S&P, Asia CCS,
and ESORICS. The selection of the venues was based
on their high visibility in the security domain.
Next, we created the search string. In particular,
we used two groups of keywords. The first group (line 1
below) is meant to scope the area of the study, while the
second group (lines 2–4) included the terms referring
to the parts of an assurance case. As a result, the we
formed the search string as follows:
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Table 5 Inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion criteria
1. Studies addressing the creation, management,
or application of security assurance cases.
2. Studies related to security/privacy/trust assurance.
3. Studies related to security/privacy/trust argumentation.
Exclusion criteria
1. Studies written in any language other than English.
2. Studies published before 2004.
3. Short papers (less than 3 pages).
4. Studies focusing on risk/threat/hazard detection.
5. Studies addressing risk/threat/hazard analysis.
6. Studies addressing cryptography.
7. Studies focusing on security assessment/evaluation.
8. Studies about (only) safety assurance.
1 ( s e c u r i t y OR pr ivacy OR t ru s t ) AND
2 ( cla im OR argument OR evidence
3 OR j u s t i f i c a t i o n OR ’ assurance case ’
4 OR assurance )
As a quality check for our search string, we used
three relevant known studies [20,8,79], which are listed
in IEEE Xplore. We ran the query in the same library
and confirmed that those papers were returned.
3.2.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
The inclusion and exclusion criteria are shown in table
5. The inclusion criteria are rather straightforward, con-
sidering to the nature of this SLR. Concerning the ex-
clusion criteria, we have decided to only consider stud-
ies written in English language, as this is the com-
mon language among the authors of this SLR. Fur-
ther, SAC have been the focus of research only in recent
times (although assurance cases, in general, have been
around for much longer) and the field is rapidly evolv-
ing. Hence, we restricted our SLR to the past 15 years,
also to to avoid outdated results. We also excluded short
papers, as answering our research questions requires
studies with results rather than only ideas. Finally, ex-
clusion criteria 4–8 exclude studies that focus on topics
that are marginally related to SAC but would not not
help us answer our research questions.
3.2.3 Searching and filtering the results
We executed the query on three libraries (IEEE Xplore,
ACMDigital Library, and Scopus) in January 2019, and
got the results shown in Table 6. In the case of Scopus,
we limited the search to the domains of either computer
science or engineering. Also, because of the high num-
ber of returned results from Scopus, we decided to limit
the included studies to the first 2000 after ordering the
Table 6 Number of included studies after each round of fil-
tration.
After filtering round
Library Papers 1st 2nd 3rd
IEEE Xplore 4513 118 23 22
ACM DL 1927 35 3 3
Scopus 2000 68 23 19
+7 (snowballing)
Total 8440 51
results based on relevance. We believe that the consid-
ered studies were sufficient, as the last 200 papers of the
retained set from Scopus (i.e., papers 1801-2000) were
all excluded when we applied the first filtering round
(see below).
In the first filtering round, we applied the inclusion
and exclusion criteria to the titles and keywords of all
the results we got from the search (8440 papers). As
shown in Table 6 This round reduced the number of
studies to 211 papers. In the second filtering round, we
applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria1 to the ab-
stracts and conclusions of the 211 remaining studies.
After this step, the number of studies was reduced to
49. In the last filtering round, we fully read the remain-
ing 49 papers, applied the inclusion and exclusion cri-
teria on the whole text, and ended up with 44 included
studies.
After finishing the three filtering rounds, we started
performing the snowball search method [77]. This step
added seven papers. Hence, the total number of in-
cluded studies was raised to 51 papers.
4 Results
In this section, we provide a descriptive analysis of the
included papers in this SLR, and then present the re-
sults and answers to our four research questions.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2 shows the years when our 51 included studies
were published. The graph shows a peak of 10 publica-
tions in 2015, which indicates an increase in interest in
the research filed compared to previous years, especially
the time between 2005 and 2012 where the number of
publications was three or less each year.
Figure 3 shows the venues where the included stud-
ies were published. The graph shows that most of the
publications were made in conferences and workshops
1 Except for exclusion criteria 1,2, and 8, which only needed
to be applied once.
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(18 and 17 respectively). 13 of the papers were pub-
lished in journals, and three were technical reports.
We also looked into the authors of the selected pa-
pers to find the portion of the papers with at least
one author from industry. We found that less than 25%
(12 papers) [16,28,51,50,79,24,57,11,49,26,14,38] in-
cluded at least one author from industry.
4.2 RQ1: Motivation
In order to find the rational reported in literature for
the adoption of SAC, we looked into motivations and
usage scenarios, as explained in 3.1. Some of the iden-
tified motivations in RQ1.1 could also be seen as usage
scenario. For example, compliance with standards and
regulation could be seen as a motivation for using SAC,
but also as a purpose for which SAC could be used.
4.2.1 Motivation
Generally speaking, the main reason that motivates us-
age of SAC is to perform security assurance on a system.
In this study, we looked for other motivations, and more
specific ones. We extracted this piece of information by
looking for motivations to use SAC rather than the sug-
gested approach or method for creating them. In some
of the papers, the motivation was made explicit in a sep-
arate section, or as the focus of the whole study (e.g.
[41,4]). However, in most papers, this was discussed ei-
ther in the introduction and background sections, or as
a part of motivating the used or suggested approach for
creating SAC. If a study discusses only the basic SAC
benefits, or is not being specific about the motivation
(e.g. motivates security assurance in general), then we
have categorised this paper as one that did not discuss
any motivations for using SAC.
Table 7 shows all motivations found in the 51 studies
included in this paper. The results show that about 73%
of the studies included at least one motivation for using
SAC other than security assurance. The most common
motivations are: (i) compliance with standards and reg-
ulation (8); (ii) it is a proven approach from the safety
domain (6); and (iii) compliance with requirements (4).
Categorizing the motivations resulted in the following
categories:
– External forces: Compliance with standards and reg-
ulation, and compliance with requirements (in case
of suppliers).
– Process improvement: SAC helps in integrating se-
curity assurance with the development process. More-
over, they help factoring work per work items, and
analyzing complex systems.
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Fig. 3 Types of publication of the included studies
– Structure and documentation: The structure of SAC
implies a way of work that reduces technical risks,
and enhances security communication among stake-
holders.
– Security assessment: SAC help in assessing security
and spotting weaknesses in security for the systems
in question. Hence, they help building confidence in
the those systems.
– Knowledge transfer: It is a proven approach in safety
which has been used effectively for a long time, and
could be similarly in security.
4.2.2 Usage Scenarios
While SACs are usually used to establish evidence-based
security assurance for a given system, researchers have
reported cases where SAC could be used to achieve dif-
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Table 7 RQ1 — Papers stating the motivations for using SAC
Study Category Motivation
Ankrum et al. [5] External forces Comply with standards and regulation
Calinescu et al. [12] External forces Comply with security requirements of safety-critical systems
Cyra et al. [18] External forces Comply with standards and regulation
Finnegan et al. [20] External forces Comply with regulation and maintain confidence in the
product in question
Finnegan et al. (2) [21] External forces Comply with regulation
He et al. [35] External forces Reason about cybersecurity policies and procedures
Mohammadi et al. [47] External forces Learn from the safety domain where it is a proven approach
Ray et al. [56] External forces Comply with regulation and internal needs from
cyber-physical systems’ manufacturers
Sklyar et al. (2) [63,65,64] External forces Comply with standards
Sljivo et al. [66] External forces Comply with standards and regulation
Strielkina et al. [69] External forces Comply with security regulation
Goodger et al. [28] Knowledge transfer Learn from the safety domain to integrate oversight for
safety and security
Ionita et al. [38] Knowledge transfer Learn from the safety domain where it is a proven approach
Netkachova et al. (2) [49] Knowledge transfer Learn from the safety domain where it is a proven approach
Poreddy et al. [55] Knowledge transfer Learn from the safety domain, where it is a proven approach
Sklyar et al. [62] Knowledge transfer Learn from the safety domain, where it is a proven in-use
approach
Ben Othmane et al. [7] Process improvement Trace security requirements and assure security during
iterative development.
Ben Othmane et al. [8] Process improvement Assure security during iterative development
Cheah et al. [14] Process improvement Cope with the increasing connectivity of systems
Cockram et al. [16] Process improvement Reduces both technical and program risks through process
improvement
Gallo et al. [26] Process improvement Factor analytical and implementation work per component,
requisite, technology, or life-cycle
Lipson et al. [42] Process improvement Help analyzing complex systems
Netkachova et al. [50] Process improvement Tackle security issues which have intensified challenges of
engineering safety-critical systems.
Weinstock et al. [75] Process improvement Include people and processes in security assurance in
addition to technology
Alexander et al. [4] Security assessment Help security evaluators to focus their attention on critical
parts of the system
Bloomfield et al. [11] Security assessment Ensure the fulfillment of security requirements
Finnegan et al. [21] Security assessment Improve overall security practices and demonstrate
confidence in security
Hawkins et al. [34] Security assessment Justify and assess confidence in critical properties
Knight [41] Security assessment Spot security related weaknesses in the system
Poreddy et al. [55] Security assessment Assist in identifying security loopholes while changing the
system
Rodes et al. [57] Security assessment Measure software security
Strielkina et al. [69] Security assessment Acquire an input for decision making of requirement
conformity
Vivas et al. [74] Security assessment Acquire confidence that the security of the system meets the
requirements
Agudo et al. [3] Structure & documentation Incorporate certifications and evaluation methods in an
evidence-based structure
Alexander et al. [4] Structure & documentation Summarize security thinking when vendors are involved
Finnegan et al. [22] Structure & documentation Communicate and report achieved security level
Knight [41] Structure & documentation Document rational for security claims
Netkachova et al. [51] Structure & documentation Aid in communication as it provides a summary of issues
and their interrelationship
Patu et al. [54] Structure & documentation Aid in the survival of modern system, with respect to
security challenges
Ray et al. [56] Structure & documentation Comply with internal needs from cyber-physical systems’
manufacturers
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ferent goals. We looked into studies that focus on using
SAC for a purpose other than security assurance, or
that is specific to a certain domain (e.g. security as-
surance for medical devices), or context (e.g. security
assurance within the agile framework). Table 8 shows
the usage scenarios of SAC found in literature. We were
able to extract usage scenarios from 14 different papers
(28% of the total number of papers). The usage sce-
narios found show a wide range of applications of SAC.
Seven of the papers suggest using SAC for evaluating
different parts of the system or its surroundings. This
includes evaluating the system architecture [80], secu-
rity in a specific context [49], confidence in security [57],
trustworthiness of the system [47], validation of service
grade [44], satisfaction of requirements [33], and secu-
rity standards [30]. The remaining seven papers suggest
using SAC for process improvement [3], development of
security features [7,8], development of security policies
and strategies [11], asset management [28], and teach-
ing information security [26].
4.3 RQ2: Approaches
We were able to find 26 different approaches in the lit-
erature. These studies focus on creating either complete
security assurance cases, or parts of them (argumenta-
tion, or evidence). Table 9 shows the found approaches,
which part/s of SAC they cover, argumentation strate-
gies used to divide the claims and create the arguments,
and the evidence used to justify the claims in the ap-
proaches. We categorize the approaches as follows:
– Integrating SAC in the development life-cycle: These
approaches suggest mapping the SAC creation ac-
tivities to the development activities to integrate
SACs in the development and security processes [3,
8,56,74], as well as assurance case driven design [62,
63,65,64].
– Using different types of AC for security: These ap-
proaches suggest using different types of assurance
cases other than SAC for security assurance. These
types are: trust cases [18], trustworthiness cases [29,
47], combined safety and security cases [16],dynamic
assurance cases [12],multiple viewpoint assurance cases
where security is treated as an assurance viewpoint
[66], and dependability cases [53].
– Documenting and visualizing SAC: These studies
give guidelines of how to document a SAC, and visu-
alize it [55,17,75]. In this category there are papers
that focus on a specific part of SAC. These are:
Argumentation-centric: These approaches focus
on the argumentation part of the SACs. Different
strategies are suggested in literature: security standards-
based argument [18,20,5], and satisfaction argument
[33]. Structures of argumentation found in literature
are: model-based [34], and layered structure [51,79].
Moreover, we have one study which suggests an au-
tomatic creation of argument graphs [72].
Evidence-centric: These approaches focus mainly
on different aspects of SACs’ evidence. These as-
pects are: searching for evidence [15], collecting and
generating evidence [60,42], and rating of potential
artifacts to be used as evidence [14].
4.3.1 Coverage
As shown in Table 9, 16 of the found approaches cover
the creation of complete SACs, six focus on argumen-
tation, and the remaining four on evidence. Five out
of the 16 studies to create complete security cases did
not include any examples of evidence used to justify the
claims.
4.3.2 Argumentation
Argumentation is a very important part of SAC, and
forms the bigger part of it. The argumentation starts
with a security claim, and continues as the claim is be-
ing broken down into sub-claims. The strategy is used to
provide a means by which the breaking down of claims
is being done. Each level of the argumentation could
be done with a different strategy than the other lev-
els. Hence, one SAC might have one or more argumen-
tation strategies, which is the case in some of the in-
cluded studies in this SLR. We looked for an explicit
mention of the used strategy. If none was provided, we
looked into the example cases to find the used argu-
mentation strategy. Here, we look at the argumentation
strategies used in the different approaches. We could
not find any correlation between the approach, and the
argumentation strategy used in the approach. For in-
stance, the approaches which integrate SAC within the
development life-cycle can have different argumenta-
tion strategies, e.g., requirements [3] and development
phases [56]. The most common strategy depends on the
output of a threat, vulnerability, asset or risk analysis
(8 papers). Other popular strategies are: breaking down
the claims based on the requirements, or more specif-
ically quality requirements and even more specifically
security requirements (5 papers), and arguing based on
security properties (5 papers). Additionally, researchers
also used system and security goals (4 papers), software
components or features (3 papers), security standards
and principles (2 papers), pre-defined argumentation
model (1 paper), and development life-cycle phases (1
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Table 8 RQ1 — Papers relevant to understanding the usage scenarios
Study Usage scenarios
Agudo et al. [3] Integrating security engineering and assurance based development using SAC
Ben Othmane et al. [7] Controlling the impact of incremental development on security assurance using SAC
Ben Othmane et al. (2) [8] Developing iterative security features using SAC for security assurance
Bloomfield et al. [11] Using SAC in the development of security strategies and policies
Finnegan et al. [22] Reporting the achieved security level using SAC
Gallo et al. [26] Using SAC to teach information security
Goodger et al. [28] Asset management
Graydon et al. [31] Evaluation of security standards
Haley et al. [33] Using SAC to prove achieving satisfaction of security requirements
Masumoto et al. [44] SAC is used to validate that a service satisfies a certain service grade
Mohammadi et al. [47] Ensuring trustworthiness in cyber-physical systems using trustworthiness cases.
Netkachova et al. (2) [49] Evaluation of security of critical infrastructures using SAC
Rodes et al. [57] Measuring software security based on confidence in security argument
Yamamoto [80] Evaluation of system architecture based on security claims
paper). Table 9 shows the approaches we found in liter-
ature with the respective argumentation strategies used
in each of them.
4.3.3 Evidence
Even though evidence is a very important part of SAC,
and a complex one as well, only four of 26 included ap-
proaches focused on it. Even in the generic approaches,
there was a much deeper focus on the argumentation
than the evidence. This explains why five out of the
16 generic approaches did not even include an exam-
ple of what evidence would look like in their approach.
We found evidence either by looking for explicitly men-
tioned ones in the articles, or by extracting the evi-
dence part from the reported SACs. Cheah et al. [14]
present a classification of security test results using se-
curity severity ratings. This classification can be in-
cluded in the security evaluation, which may be used
to improve the selection of evidence when creating se-
curity assurance cases. Chindamaikul et al. [15] inves-
tigate how information retrieval techniques, and formal
concept analysis can be used to find security evidence
in a document corpus. Shrott and Weber [60] present a
method to apply fuzz testing to support the creation of
evidence for security assurance cases. Lipson and We-
instock [42] describe how to understand, gather, and
generate multiple kinds of evidence that can contribute
to building SAC. The most common types of evidence
reported in literature are testing results (12 papers) [7,
12,14,15,42,55,60,62,63,65,64,66], and different types
of analysis. These analysis include threat and vulner-
ability [16,20,21,53], code and bug [15,7,62,63,65,64],
security standards and policies [3,51], risk [47], and log
analysis [47,53]. Other types of evidence reported in
literature include process documents [42], design tech-
niques [47], and security awareness and training [53,
42]. Table 9 shows the approaches we found in litera-
ture with the respective evidence types used in each of
them.
4.4 RQ3: Support
4.4.1 Tools:
We found 16 software tools which have been used one
way or another in the creation on security assurance
cases in literature. Seven out of the found tools were
created by the researchers. Four of these seven target
assurance cases in general [23,24,34,72], while the re-
maining three are created to be used in the creation
of SAC specifically [7,14,60]. Table 10 shows the found
tools, and the respective studies in which the tools are
used. A brief description of the main functionalities of
the tools, as well as whether the tools are created or
used by the authors are also presented. There are four
main types of reported tools:
– Creation tools: These are used to create and docu-
ment assurance cases in general[2,27,24,45]
– Argumentation tools: These focus mainly on the cre-
ation of the argumentation part of SAC[34,82,39,
72]
– Evidence tools: These focus on the creation of SAC
evidence[6,60]
– Support tools: These are used to assist the creators
of SAC in the analysis needed for creating SAC[76,
7,14], maintenance of SAC[23], and management of
different parts of SAC[71].
In addition to these software tools, a concept called
concept lattice was used as a tool to help users deter-
mine the relevance of a given document to be used as
an evidence[15].
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Table 9 RQ2 — Papers presenting approaches to construct SAC
Study Approach Coverage Argumentation Evidence
Agudo et al. [3] Assurance-based
development
Generic Requirements, system goals,
system views and models
Common criteria
evaluation
Ankrum et al. [5] Mapping SAC to
standards
Generic Security standard
description
NA
Ben Othmane et
al. [8]
Security assurance for
incremental software
development
Generic Security goals Test results, code review
Calinescu et al.
[12]
Dynamic assurance cases Generic Requirements Verification results
Cheah et al. [14] Systematic Security
Evaluation
Evidence NA Rated test results
Chindamaikul et
al. [15]
Document retrieval and
formal concept analysis
Evidence Security properties Test results, bug fixes
reports
Cockram et al.
[16]
Dependability by
contract
Argument Vulnerabilities, threats, and
mitigation
Threat analysis report,
vulnerability analysis
report
Coffey et al. [17] Concept map-based Generic Vulnerabilities NA
Cyra et al. [18] Using Trust-cases to
comply with security
standards
Argument Risks NA
Finnegan et al.
[20,21]
Risk based approach Generic Security capabilities,
mitigation controls
Threat logs, vulnerability
logs
Gor`ski et al. [29] TRUST-IT Maintenance
and assessment of
trustworthiness
arguments
Generic Toulmin’s argument [73] NA
Haley et al. [33] Satisfaction arguments Argument Security requirements NA
Hawkins et al.
[34]
Model-based assurance Argument Software components NA
Lipson et al. [42] Evidence-based assurance
of security properties
Evidence NA Process documents, test
results, and many more.
Mohammadi et
al. [47]
Trustworthiness cases Generic Availability, threat analysis,
goals satisfaction
Risk assessment reports,
log analysis, design
techniques
Netkachova et al.
[51]
Layered Approach Generic Source of security
requirements, changes
during life-cycle
Security analysis, security
policies
Patu et al. (2)
[53]
Evidence-based
dependability case
Generic Vulnerabilities Countermeasures to
vulnerabilities, security
awareness documents,
access control, logs
Poreddy et al.
[55]
Documenting AC for
Security
Generic Security properties Test results
Ray et al. [56] Integrating security
engineering and AC
development
Generic Development life-cycle
phases
NA
Shortt et al. [60] Hermes Targeted fuzz
testing
Evidence NA Test results
Sklyar et al. [62,
65,63,64]
Assurance Case Driven
Design
Generic Quality requirements,
security properties, features,
components, software layers,
green IT principles
Code analysis, testing
reports
Sljivo et al. [66] Multiple-viewpoint AC Generic Contracts (pair of
assumptions and guarantees)
Test results
Tippenhauer et
al. [72]
Automatic generation of
security argument graphs
Argument Security goals NA
Vivas et al. [74] Security assurance driven
software development
Generic Threats, vulnerabilities NA
Weinstock et al.
[75]
Arguing security Generic Prevention and detection Test results, Analysis tool
results, developers’ training
Xu et al. [79] Layered Argument
strategy
Argument Assets, threats NA
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Table 10 RQ3 — Tools supporting the creation, documentation, and visualization of SAC.
Study Tool support Description Used or created
Ankrum et al. [5] Adelard Safety
Case Editor
(ASCE) [2]
Notation tool used for creating SACs Used
Ben Othmane et al. [7] Meld[76] Visual diff and merge tool Used
SECUREAGILE Tracing the impact of code changes on security Created
Calinescu et al. [12] UPPAAL [6] A verification tool which helps produce
assurance evidence
Used
Cheah et al. [14] Software tool (no
specific name)
Semi-automated test execution tool Created
Finnegan et al. [22] TurboAC [27] Generating and documenting SACs Used
Fung et al. [23] MMINT-A Automated change impact assessment on
assurance cases
Created
Gacek et al. [24] Resolute Constructing assurance cases based on
architecture analysis and design language models
Created
Gor`ski et al. [29] NOR-STA [71] A set of services used for argumentation editing
and assessment, as well as evidence repositories
Used
Hawkins et al. [34] Instantiation
program (no
specific name)
Creates an instantiation model, which is then
converted into a GSN argument
Created
Ionita et al. [38] OpenArgue [82] The study compares these argument modelling
tools
Used
Argumentation Sheets
ArgueSecure [39]
Patu et al. [53] D-Case
Editor [45]
Assurance case editor and a GSN Pattern
Library for Eclipse
Used
Poreddy et al. [55] Adelard Safety
Case Editor
(ASCE) [2]
Notation tool used for creating SACs Used
Shortt et al. [60] Hermes Dynamic code coverage analysis for evidence
creation
Created
Tippenhauer et al. [72] CyberSAGE [61] Automatically generates argument graphs Created
4.4.2 Prerequisites:
Prerequisites are the conditions that need to be met in
order for the outcome of a study to work or be applied.
We found prerequisites in the included studies by check-
ing the inputs of the proposed outcomes (approaches,
usage scenarios, tools, and patterns). If an input is not
a part of the outcome itself, we considered it to be a
prerequisite to that outcome. Table 11 shows the found
prerequisites, and the respective type of study for each.
There are 17 reported prerequisites. The majority be-
long to approaches (11) and the remaining belong to
usage scenarios (3), patterns (2), and tools (1). We cat-
egorize the prerequisites in four categories as follows:
– Usage of specific format [24,34,66]
– Existence of analysis and modelling [14,28,54,79]
– Usage of specific documents and repositories [15,16,
35,53,72,74], and security standards [5,31,18]
– Existence of special expertise [11]
4.4.3 Patterns
Patterns of SAC exist, as there are reoccurring claims
and arguments. Using patterns can save the creators
of SACs a lot of time and effort. We found ten stud-
ies which deal with patterns. Six of these create their
own argumentation patterns [20,21,35,54,55,79]. The
remaining four include usage of patterns [34,72], a guide-
line for creating and documenting security case patterns
[75], and a catalogue of security and safety case patterns
[70]. In some studies, the examples are taken from the
safety domain, and there is a usage of safety patterns
e.g. [12]. However, in this study, we only considered
patterns created and used for security assurance cases.
Table 12 shows the papers that deal with security as-
surance case patterns.
4.4.4 Notations
41 out of our 51 included papers specify at least one
notation to be used for expressing and documenting a
SAC. The most common notation is the Goal Structure
Notation (GSN) [67] which is suggested by 26 studies.
Another popular notation is the Claim Argument Ev-
idence (CAE) [1] notation which is suggested by nine
studies. Other notation are: text (6 studies), concept
maps [17] (1), and Claim-Argument-Evidence Criteria
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Table 11 RQ3 — Papers discussing the prerequisites of SAC approaches, usage scenarios, and tools.
Study Type of study Prerequisites
Ankrum et al. [5] Approach Security standards
Bloomfield et al. [11] Usage scenario Special expertise (regulator in this case)
Cheah et al. [14] Approach Threat model
Chindamaikul et al. [15] Approach Evidence corpus
Cockram et al. [16] Approach Module boundary contract
Cyra et al. [18] Approach Security standards
Gacek et al. [24] Tool Use of AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design Language)
Goodger et al. [28] Usage Scenario Asset and vulnerability analysis
Graydon et al. [31] Usage Scenario Security standards
Hawkins et al. [34] Approach Argument patterns, and models containing needed information for
instantiation
He et al. [35] SAC Pattern Lessons learned
Patu et al. [54] SAC patterns Asset analysis
Patu et al. (2) [53] Approach A pre-defined list of common risks/vulnerabilities and solutions in
the domain
Sljivo et al. [66] Approach Contracts in the extended SEooCMM format (a special format)
Tippenhauer et al. [72] Approach Graph extension templates, and sub-graphs derived from security
assessment
Vivas et al. [74] Approach Well defined SDLC (Software Development Life-Cycle) process
Xu et al. [79] Approach Threat model, and asset model
Table 12 RQ3 — Papers presenting patterns.
Study Description of the pattern-based approach
Finnegan et al. [20,21] Creation of security capability argument pattern which takes a risk based approach,
and argues for each security capability defined in a technical report for risk
management in medical devices.
Hawkins et al. [34] Usage of argument patterns as input to the model-based approach for building
assurance case arguments. A suggested pattern argues over individual software
components.
He et al. [35] Creation of generic cases which use security arguments that are informed by
security incidents in healthcare organizations.
Patu et al. [54] Creation of security patterns at the requirement phase of the system development
life-cycle. One suggested pattern argues over security attributes.
Poreddy et al. [55] Creation of assurance case patterns, suggested argumentation strategies are:
integrity, availability, reliability, confidentiality and maintainability.
Taguchi et al. [70] A catalogue of safety and security case patterns. The patterns are derived from
process patterns through a literature survey.
Tippenhauer et al. [72] Usage of argument patterns to automatically generate argument graphs. The paper
includes five different patterns categorized into two categories: inter-type, and
intra-type.
Weinstock et al. [75] A guideline of how to create and use security assurance case patterns is presented.
An example pattern is also presented.
Xu et al. [79] Creation of different argument patterns to be used in different layers to form a
layered argument structure.
(CAEC) [50,51,49] notation which is extension of the
CAE notation (3 studies of the same authors).
4.5 RQ4: Validation
We consider validation to be the process to confirm the
applicability of an outcome in the selected studies as
validation. In case validation is performed in a selected
study, we looked for the type of validation, the domain
of application, the source of data, whether a SAC is
created during the validation, the creators of the SACs,
and who performed the validation. Table 13 shows the
results of RQ4. As shown in the table, 36 studies in-
clude a validation of the outcome. The majority of the
outcomes (21) were validated using illustrative cases,
11 were validated using case studies, and the remaining
four used experiments (3) and observation as a part of
an Action Design Research (ADR) [59] study. The data
sources vary among the validations, as can be seen in
Table 13. We categorize these sources into three main
categories:
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– Research, open source, and in-house projects (20) [5,
15,16,17,24,33,34,47,51,53,55,56,57,60,64,66,69,72,
74,26]
– Commercial products / systems (9) [7,8,12,14,28,
29,44,79,49]
– Standards, regulation, and technical reports (7) [11,
18,21,23,31,35,65]
SACs were presented in 31 out of the 36 valida-
tions. Representing a complete SAC is in most cases not
possible even in small illustration cases, because of the
amount of information required to build one. However,
the scale of SAC representation in the included valida-
tions varies to a large extent. Some validations present
an example of a full branch of SAC, i.e., a claim all the
way from top to evidence (e.g., He and Johnson [35]),
while others present very brief examples of SACs (e.g.,
Gallo and Dahab [26]). Table 13 also shows the creators
of the SACs in each study. In only two cases, experts
were used to create the SACs. In the majority of the
studies (28), the authors created the SACs. However,
eight of these had authors from industry. These are
shown in Table 13 as Authors* in the Creators column.
Table 13 also shows the domains in which the vali-
dation was conducted. The most common domains are:
Software Engineering (7), and Medical (7).
The last column in Table 13 shows the persons which
performed the validation in each study. Out of the 36
included validations, only five used 3rd parties to vali-
date the outcomes. In the remaining 31 validations, the
authors performed the validation. However, eight out
of these had authors from industry. These are shown in
Table 13 as Authors* in the Validator column.
5 Discussion
Our findings show that the area of security assurance
cases has not yet reached the same level of maturity
as their safety counterpart has. In the following sub-
sections, we will list the various reasons for that.
We also realised through our study that there is
agreement about how security assurance cases are con-
structed in the literature. However, this agreement is
not expressed in sufficient level of detail in any one
paper yet. Therefore, we have synthesised the existing
knowledge into a generic workflow for the construction
of SAC that is presented in Section 5.5.
Main insights into the body of knowledge:
– Many good motivations and usage scenarios, but not
reflected.
– Room for creativity, and making use of the knowl-
edge in safety in the approaches.
– Room for improvement on the support (tools and
patterns)
– Lack of industrial validation of both approaches and
usage scenarios
Synthesis is workflow which combines the different ideas
and approaches from the body of knowledge
5.1 Motivation and usage scenarios
We were able to identify many motivations and usage
scenarios from literature for using SAC. However, our
impression is that these are on a high level and lack de-
tailed studies to show how realistic and applicable they
are. For example, many papers motivate SAC for com-
pliance with regulation and standards. However, they
do not pinpoint the specific requirements for using SAC
in these regulation and standards. It is hard to deter-
mine whether SACs are explicitly required, or if it is
recommended as a way to create a structured argument
for security without having previous knowledge of the
specific regulation or standard.
5.2 Approaches
Most of the reported approaches to create complete
assurance cases (including the argumentation and evi-
dence) are top-down. That is, they start building from
a top claim, all the way to sub-claims and evidence.
Yamamoto [80] who made an evaluation of architecture
based on security and safety claims used a bottom-up
technique starting from the evidence all the way up
to the strategy and first claim. No approach suggests
a bottom-up approach starting from the evidence, i.e.,
building up from the existing evidence to form the ar-
gumentation and conclude what can be claimed about
the system’s security. This approach can be useful if the
SAC is built for an already existing system. The evalua-
tion can be then done between the “what we can claim”,
and the “what goals and requirements does the system
have” questions. However, some of the selected stud-
ies used a hybrid approach where the SACs were still
created top-down, but some parts of them were built
using bottom-up techniques. An examples of a bottom-
up technique used in literature is FMEA [68] used in
two studies [34,22].
Many of the approaches presented in literature treat
security and safety cases as the same artifacts, e.g., [15,
31,34,66,28,23,5,24,64,65]. We believe that since as-
surance cases in general are mature in the safety do-
main and have been used for a long time, it is natural to
consider the gained knowledge and transferring it into
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Table 13 RQ4 — Papers presenting a form of validation
Study Validation Domain Data source SAC Creators Validators
Ankrum et al. [5] Illustration Security Research security project Authors Authors
Ben Othmane et al. [7] Case study Software
Engineering
E-Commerce product
√
Authors 3rd party
Ben Othmane et al. (2) [8] Illustration Telecom Commercial project
√
Authors Authors
Bloomfield et al. [11] Case study Safety Regulatory organization
√
Authors* 3rd party
Calinescu et al. [12] Case study Marine,
Trading
Underwater Vehicle System,
Trading System
√
Authors Authors
Cheah et al. [14] Case study Automotive Vehicle infotainment system,
diagnostics tool
√
Authers* 3rd party
Chindamaikul et al. [15] Experiment Information
Retrieval
Open source software
development project
√
Expert group Authors
Cockram et al. [16] Illustration SafSec Command and control system
for locating persons
√
Authors* Authors*
Coffey et al. [17] Illustration Software
Engineering
SOA composite application
√
Expert group 3rd party
Cyra et al. [18] Illustration Security Security standard BS 7799-2
√
Authors Authors
Finnegan et al. (2) [21] Observation Medical Technical report
√
Authors 3rd party
Fung et al. [23] Case study Automotive Power sliding door – Case
from ISO26262 standard
√
Authors Authors
Gacek et al. [24] Illustration Embedded
Systems
Research project for
unmanned air vehicles
√
Authors* Authors*
Gallo et al. [26] Experiment Education Course in information security
√
NA Authors*
Goodger et al. [28] Case study Critical in-
frastructure
Critical information
Infrastructure
NA Authors*
Gòrski et al. [29] Case study Medical A software for patient
monitoring
√
Authors Authors
Graydon et al. [31] Case study Security Security standards
√
Authors Authors
Haley et al. [33] Illustration Software
Engineering
Example HR system NA Authors
Hawkins et al. [34] Illustration Model-Based
Engineering
Cryptographic controller
system
√
Authors Authors
He et al. [35] Case study Medical Lessons learned from security
incidents, security standards,
policies, and procedures
√
Authors Authors
Masumoto et al. [44] Experiment Software
Engineering
Commercial web application
√
Authors Authors
Mohammadi et al. [47] Illustration Medical OPerational Trustworthiness
Enabling Technologies
(OPTET) research project
√
Authors Authors
Netkachova et al. [51] Illustration Aviation A security gateway data-flow
controller
√
Authors* Authors*
Netkachova et al. (2) [49] Case study Critical in-
frastructure
Electrical power system
√
Authors* Authors*
Patu et al. (2) [53] Illustration Networking Research e-learning project
√
Authors Authors
Poreddy et al. [55] Illustration Aviation Avionic mission control
computer system
√
Authors Authors
Ray et al. [56] Illustration Medical A medical cyber-physical
system for pumping insulin
√
Authors Authors
Rodes et al. [57] Illustration Security Example scenario with
confidence properties
measurement
√
Authors* Authors*
Shortt et al. [60] Illustration Software
Engineering
Java-based open source
library (Crawler4J)
NA Authors
Sklyar et al. (3) [65] Illustration SafSec Requirements derived from
safety and security standard
√
Authors Authors
Sklyar et al. (4) [64] Illustration Medical Example medical system
√
Authors Authors
Sljivo et al. [66] Illustration Aviation Wheel breaking system
√
Authors Authors
Strielkina et al. [69] Illustration Medical Healthcare IoT system NA Authors
Tippenhauer et al. [72] Illustration Electrical An electrical power grid use
case
√
Authors Authors
Vivas et al. [74] Illustration Software
Engineering
The research project PICOS
(Privacy and Identity
Management for Community
Services)
√
Authors Authors
Xu et al. [79] Case study Software
Engineering
IM server
√
Authors* Authors*
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other domains, such as the security domain. However,
this knowledge transfer has to take into consideration
the differences between safety and security e.g. in terms
of field maturity and nature. Although we decided to
include these studies in this SLR, we still think that
their applicability in security needs further investiga-
tion taking into consideration the differences between
the domains. Alexander et al. [4] have a discussion on
the differences between safety and security both from
theoretical, and practical aspects. Other studies com-
bine security and safety assurance by creating combined
arguments or security-informed safety arguments [70,
50,16,51].
Another observation we made is the lack of quality
assurance in the approaches. The approaches to create
the arguments for example do not discuss the ability
of the approach to assure the quality of the argumen-
tation when it comes to its completeness, i.e., does the
argumentation cover all and only the relevant security
claims of the system? When it comes to the evidence
creation approaches, there is a lack of quality assurance
of confidence of the evidence, i.e., how confident are we
that the provided evidence are enough to justify the
claims associated with it?
5.3 Validation
Our results show a clear domination of illustration as
the chosen type of validation in the included literature,
which is an indicator of lack of industrial involvement.
This explains why the majority of data used for valida-
tion are from research projects and example systems.
Furthermore, the creation and validation of SAC in lit-
erature is mainly done by the authors of the studies,
except for a few cases. We believe that this contributed
heavily to the lack of studies that address challenges
and drawbacks of applying SACs in an industrial con-
text.
It is fair to say that based on literature, applying
SAC is not a trivial task, and doing so in an industrial
context increases the complexity drastically. However,
most of the reported motivations and usage scenarios
are applicable in industry. Hence, there is a clear gap
between research and industry, which needs to be ad-
dressed and closed.
5.4 Tools
Despite the fact that many of the selected papers in-
cluded an example of a SAC, only a few reported on
supporting tools for creating these cases. By extracting
tool support information, it became clear that there
is no set of commonly used tools for performing secu-
rity cases tasks, such as creation documentation and
maintenance. In fact only one tool, ASCE [2], has been
reported to be used in more than one study. More-
over, there is a lack of tools addressing complex issues
in SAC, such as claims dependencies, traceability, and
quality control, e.g., evidence coverage. We did identify
tools that address some of these matters [23,60], but we
believe there is a need for validating these in industry
and specifically for security cases.
5.5 SAC creation workflow
Based on the results of this systematic literature review,
we have found that the outcomes of the literature fall in
one or more parts of the workflow depicted in Figure 4.
Our flow diagram follows the top-down approach used
in most reported approaches in literature.
Ankrum et. al. [5] created a non-deterministic work-
flow for developing a structured assurance case. How-
ever, the proposed flow does not include anything re-
lated to tools or patterns usage. It does not consider
the preliminary stage of considering a SAC either. Cyra
and Gorski [18] present the life-cycle, derivation proce-
dure, and application process for a trust case template.
All these artifacts, however, build on the argumenta-
tion strategy being derived from a standard, which is
not always the case.
There are five main blocks in the workflow. We will
list and describe them in the remainder of this subsec-
tion. Additionally, we recommend papers to read which
focus on aspects related to the individual blocks.
Study and understand SAC: Building SACs is not
trivial. It requires a lot of work and dedication. Hence,
before going ahead and creating them, it is important
to understand what they are and what they can be used
for. This step includes studying the structure of SACs,
their benefits, what needs to be in place to create them,
and their potential usage scenarios, e.g., standards and
regulation compliance. Figure 5 shows the correspond-
ing entity in the workflow with the recommended pa-
pers, which are [4,75,41,3,10,26,8].
Argumentation: This block, which is depicted in Fig-
ure 6, includes selecting the top claim to achieve, and
the strategy to decompose this claim into sub-claims.
This is a very important step, as selecting an argumen-
tation strategy decides to a big extent what activities
are needed to complete the SAC. For example, if a strat-
egy where the decomposition is based on vulnerabilities
is adopted, a vulnerability analysis of the system in
question has to be conducted. The papers we recom-
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Study and understand
SAC
Select argumentation
strategy
Locate Evidence
Decompose claim
Select Top-Claim
Create SAC
tool supported
Y Use argumentation
pattern
Assign evidence
Use pattern's
strategies
Represent /
Document SAC
Start
End
Collect evidence
Y
N
N Create own
argumentation
strategy
N
Needs further
decomposition
Y
Select tool Manualrepresentation
OK
Assess SAC
Select representation
method
Y N
YN
Fig. 4 Flowchart of SAC creation
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SAC
Create SAC
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Agudo et al. [3]
Alexander et al. [4]
Ben Othmane et al. [8]
Bllomfield et al. [10]
Gallo and Dahab [26]
Knight [41]
Weinstock et al. [75]
Fig. 5 Corresponding entities and recommended studies for
"Study and understand SAC" block
Select argumentation
strategy
Decompose claim
Select Top-Claim
Y Use argumentation
pattern
Use pattern's
strategies
N Create own
argumentation
strategy
Needs further
decomposition
Y
Agudo et al. [3]
Ben Othmane and Ali [7]
Coffey et al. [17]
Hawkins et al. [34]
Mohammadi et al. [47]
Sklyar and Kharchenko [65]
Tippenhauer et al. [72]
Vivas et al. [74]
Xu et al. [79]
Finnegan and McCaffery [20,21]
Patu and Yamamoto [54]
Taguchi et al. [70]
Weinstock et al. [75]
Xu et al. [79]
Fig. 6 Corresponding entities and recommended studies for
the Argumentation block
mend for this block are [74,79,47,72,34,17,3,7] A sub-
block of the argumentation is the usage of patterns.
Patterns help the creators of SACs to save time and
effort by using pre-defined and proven structures. The
creators could, however, decide not to use a pattern,
and create their own unique structure if the situation
requires that. Creating a pattern is done based on the
knowledge gathered while creating SACs. It is outside
the scope of this workflow. However, this is discussed
in the recommended papers [75,70,54,20,21].
Evidence: This block is shown in Figure 7, and in-
cludes locating, collecting, and assigning evidence to
the claims of the SAC. In some cases, the evidence is
not present when the SAC is being built; hence, they
need to be created. In our workflow, this would be a
part of the collect evidence activity. Moreover, these
activities might be done in an iterative manner. We
consider the iterations to include an assessment of the
SAC, e.g., to determine whether a claim needs extra
evidence to reach a certain confidence level. For this
block, we recommend these papers [42,15,14,60].
Locate Evidence
Assign evidence
Collect evidence
Cheah et al. [14]
Chindamaikul et al. [15]
Lipson and Weinstock [42]
Shrott and Weber [60]
Fig. 7 Corresponding entities and recommended studies for
the Evidence block
tool supported
Represent /
Document SAC
Select tool Manualrepresentation
Select representation
method
Y N
Ben Othmane and Ali [7]
Finnegan et al. [22]
Ionita et al. [38]
Poreddy and Corns [55]
Tippenhauer et al. [72]
Fig. 8 Corresponding entities and recommended studies for
the Documenting block
Documenting: This block is depicted in Figure 8. It
includes making a decision of whether or not to use a
tool for modelling the argument and documenting the
SAC. If a tool is used, then the notation to be used is
limited to the one/s supported by the tool. If a manual
representation is to be done, then the creators will have
the freedom to use an existing notation, extend one, or
even create their own. We recommend the papers [38,
72,7,55] for this block.
Assessment: This block is shown in Figure 9 and
focuses on assessing SACs. This is done to check the
quality of the created SAC, and determine whether it
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OK
Assess SAC
Chindamaikul et al. [15]
Rodes et al.[57]
Fig. 9 Corresponding entities and recommended studies for
the Validation block
is sufficient, or needs additional work. Assessment starts
after the claims have been identified and the evidence
is assigned to the corresponding claims. The result of
this step might require the creators of the SAC to go
back to the point where they assess a claim and make
a decision whether or not to further decompose it or
assign evidence to it. Since there is a lack of studies
that focus on quality assurance of SAC, we have rec-
ommended studies which include some metrics to help
assessing SACs [57,15].
6 Validity Threats
In this study, we consider the internal and external cat-
egories of validity threats as defined in [13], and de-
scribed in [78,40]. The work of conducting the review
was done by one researcher. This means that applying
the inclusion / exclusion criteria in each of the four fil-
tering rounds was done by one person. This imposes
a risk of subjectivity, as well as a risk of missing re-
sults, which might have affected the internal validity of
this study. To mitigate this, a preliminary list of known
good papers was manually created and used for a san-
ity check of the selected and included papers. Addition-
ally, a quality control was performed periodically by the
other authors to check the included and excluded stud-
ies.
Restricting our search to three digital libraries could
have increased the probability of the risk of missing rel-
evant studies. This was mitigated by performing the
snowballing search to search for papers that are not
necessarily included in the databases of the three con-
sidered libraries.
Another threat to validity is publication bias [40].
This is due to the fact that studies with positive re-
sults are more likely to get published than those with
negative results. This could compromise the conclusion
validity of this SLR, as in our case we did not find
any study that is, e.g., against using SAC, or which
reported a failed validation of its outcome. To miti-
gate this, we have scanned gray literature as part of
the snowballing search. Additionally, in our preliminary
work, we scanned the proceedings of eight conferences
in the past five years.
External validity depends on the internal validity
of the SLR [40], as well as the external validity of the
selected studies. We did scan gray literature to mitigate
publication bias, but we excluded studies that are under
3 pages, and old studies as exclusion criteria to mitigate
the risk of including studies with high external validity
threats.
When it comes to the reliability of the study, we
believe that any researcher with access to the used li-
braries will be able to reproduce the study, and get sim-
ilar results plus additional results for the studies which
get published after the work of this SLR is done.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this study, we conducted a systematic review of the
literature on security assurance cases. We used three
digital libraries as well as snowballing to find relevant
studies. We included 51 studies as primary data points,
and extracted the necessary data for the analysis. The
main findings of our study show that many usage sce-
narios for SAC are mentioned, and that several ap-
proaches for creating them are discussed. However, there
is a clear gap between the usage scenarios and approaches,
on one side, and their applicability in real world, on the
other side, as the provided validations and tool support
are far from being sufficient to match the level of ambi-
tion. Based on the results of this systematic literature
review, we created a workflow for working with SAC,
which is a useful tool for practitioners and also provides
a guideline on how to approach the study of the liter-
ature, i.e., which paper is relevant in each stage of the
workflow.
Based on our results and findings, in the future we
will be working to close the gap between research and
industry when it comes to applying security assurance
cases. We will be looking into exact needs and chal-
lenges for these cases in specific domains, e.g., automo-
tive. We believe that introducing SAC in large organiza-
tions needs appropriate planning to, e.g., find suitable
roles for different tasks related to SAC, and integrating
with current activities and way of working. Hence, we
see a potential direction of future work in that area.
When it comes to the technical work, we believe that
there is room for improvement in the approaches for
SAC creation, especially when it comes to the evidence
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part. For instance, a possible future work direction is
to look into ways to automatically locate, collect, and
assign evidence to different claims.
Finally, we believe that quality assurance of SAC
has not been addressed sufficiently in literature. As a
future work, we will look into ways to ensure the com-
pleteness of a security case when it comes to the ar-
gumentation, as well as the confidence in how well the
provided evidence justify these claims.
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